Abstract
Introduction
The "obesity paradox" has been reported in several observational studies, where obesity was shown to be associated to a decreased mortality in individuals suffering from a chronic disease, such as diabetes 2 or heart failure 3 . Some biological explanations have been put forward, but causal arguments have recently been given to explain this apparently paradoxical fact 4 : because the chronic disease is on a causal path between obesity and mortality, conditioning on the value of this mediator can create spurious association, or bias. And the observed "protective effect" of obesity among patients with, say, diabetes, actually has no causal value.
the bias between ∆ AS and the causal effect of A on Y conditioned on M = 1, which they define as
Here, Y A=1 and Y A=0 are two counterfactual variables or potential outcomes, that one would have been able to observe in the counterfactual worlds Ω A=1 and Ω A=0 that would have followed the intervention do(A = 1) and do(A = 0), respectively 5 . See Section 6.1 for the precise definitions of Y A=a , a ∈ {0, 1}, under the model of Figure   1 . A first remark is that there is no unique and well-defined intervention do(A = 1)
or do(A = 0) when A represents obesity. As nicely put forwarded in 6 , this makes causal inference about obesity a particularly difficult task, because assumptions such as consistency, positivity and exchangeability are unlikely to hold 6 . Here we ignore this problem just as Sperrin et al. did: we assume the existence of such an intervention and proceed as usual under structural causal models 7, 8 .
Along their derivation, it seems that Sperrin et al. assume that Y A=a is independent of A given M = 1 whereas this is generally not the case under the model of Figure 1 , because M is a descendant of A. Then, they obtain an incorrect expression for ∆ CE and the true bias ∆ CE − ∆ AS is generally much larger than what they report; see Section 2 below. As will be shown in Section 4, many configurations of the simple generative model considered by Sperrin et al. lead to an "observed protective effect" of obesity among diabetic patients (∆ AS < 0) while the causal effect ∆ CE > 0 is positive. Stated another way, (∆ AS < 0) does not imply (∆ CE < 0) under the model considered by Sperrin et al.: if the expression "obesity paradox" is intended to mean that the causal effect of obesity on early death, among the patients with chronic disease in the actual world, is negative, ∆ CE < 0, then there is no way to conclude that this obesity paradox is real from studies reporting a negative value for (an estimate of)
∆ AS , because of collider bias.
In other respect, the premise that we are interested in ∆ CE is questionable. Indeed, Denoting by Y A=a,M =m the outcome variable we would have been able to observe in the counterfactual world Ω a,m that would have followed the double intervention In Section 4, we present numerical results obtained under the same data generation mechanism as Sperrin et al., but we eventually consider additional interaction terms.
For some particular configurations, we obtain ∆ AS < 0 and ∆ CDE > 0. Therefore, a negative ∆ AS implies neither a negative ∆ CE nor a negative ∆ CDE and collider bias can fully explain the "apparent paradox".
2 Identifiability of ∆ CE and study of ∆ CE − ∆ AS
General presentation
Recall the definition 
On the left column of Page 526, the authors especially write
However, this conditional independence does generally not hold under the model depicted in Figure   1 because M is a descendant of A and, then, the set {M, U } does not satisfy the backdoor criterion; see 5, 9 . See also Fine point 7.2 in 8 where the authors use the SWIG approach 10 in a related causal model. As a result, ∆ Sp is generally different from ∆ CE under the causal model of Figure 1 .
As a matter of fact, ∆ CE can not be expressed in terms of the distribution of the 
Additional remarks
The quantity 
As explained above, this is generally false (see Figure 3 in Section 4 for an illustration).
Considering in more details the simple model where U is absent from the DAG and A has no direct effect is instructive ; see Figure 2 . In this DAG, the empty set satisfies the back-door criterion and, then,
, and the average total effect is generally non-null, as expected:
More precisely, this total effect is always non-null except in the absence of either the arrow pointing from A to M or the arrow pointing from M to Y . Next, we have 
by the tower rule.
Therefore, the assumption In our chain of equalities above, the fact that
"any" couple of random variables X and Z. Even if Y A=a is not observed, we may recall that it is still a random variable in the usual sense. Indeed, the counterfactual variables and observed variables are random variables and are all defined on a common probability space as deterministic functions of the exogenous variables ε A , ε M and ε Y ; see Section 6.1 below as well as Sections 4 and 5 in 7 and Section 3.4 in 9 for instance. As a result, standard probability calculus, among which the tower rule, apply on counterfactual variables too.
Lastly, using the SWIG approach 10 for instance, it is easy to show that A ⊥ ⊥ 
This is another way to establish that, generally, Figure 2 . Indeed, the random sets {M A=a = 1}
and {M = 1} are generally different and so are quantities
and and {M = 1}.
Controlled direct causal effects
As mentioned above, ∆ CE has to be interpreted with caution and is not related to the direct effect of A. In the presence of a mediator like M here, alternative causal effects have been advocated 11, 12 . In particular, the control direct effect captures the effect of A, while fixing the value of the mediator (e.g. to 1), and is therefore appealing in the context of the obesity paradox. The three following quantities can be considered:
The first one, ∆ CDE , is the controlled direct effect of A on Y , at M = 1 11, 12 . It compares the risk of death in counterfactual worlds Ω 12 Therefore,
Then, ∆ CDE can be written
This expression ensures that ∆ CDE = 0 in the model depicted in Figure 2 . Now, turning our attention to ∆ CDE|A=1,M =1 , we have
Therefore,
Turning our attention back on ∆ AS , observe that it writes
Sperrin et al. claim that the difference between ∆ AS and ∆ CE is possible be-
As we showed in Section 2 above, their claim is only valid for the difference between ∆ AS and ∆ Sp , and the difference between ∆ AS and ∆ CE is also due to the 
Numerical illustration
We now provide a few numerical examples illustrating the differences between the various quantities introduced above. Our objective is to show that a negative ∆ AS is not necessarily "paradoxical": more precisely, it does not imply either ∆ CE < 0 or
Data generation mechanism
We consider a generative model that can be seen as a special case of, and is then consistent with, the one described by 1 . More precisely, our data generation mechanism is obtained by specifying the structural functions f Y , f M , f A and f U as well as the distributions of the disturbances ε Y , ε M , ε A and ε U , which together lead to the same relationships between Y , A, M and U as those considered in Sperrin et al. Keep in mind that we had to specify the causal model in order to derive an analytic formula for
Denote by 1I[·] the indicator function. Define four independent random variables ε A , ε U , ε M and ε Y distributed according to a uniform distribution over the interval 
Finally, variables M and Y are defined as
Sperrin et al. only considered situations where interaction terms in the Y -model
were all null: β AM = β AU = β U M = β AU M = 0. We will show below that conclusions can be quite different when considering non-zero values for these parameters, especially when comparing ∆ AS and ∆ CDE or ∆ CDE|A=1,M =1 . Moreover, following
Sperrin et al., we set
for some ν ≥ 0. Sperrin et al. choose ν = 0, which ensures that the overall prevalence of Y is about 0.5. Here, results will be presented for this particular choice too.
However, we shall add that the proportion of configurations for which ∆ AS is negative while the causal measures ∆ CE , ∆ CDE and ∆ CDE|A=1,M =1 are positive vary with ν (a configuration standing for a particular choice for the other parameters involved in
Lastly, to be consistent with Sperrin et al.'s article, we compute measures of association and causal effects on the odds-ratio scale, rather than on the difference scale.
We will denote the corresponding quantities by OR AS , OR Sp , OR CE , OR CDE and
Results
We first consider the setting corresponding to Figure 2 Overall, under these configurations, OR AS is sensibly inferior to 1 while OR CDE , OR CDE|A=1,M =1 and OR CE are all sensibly superior to 1.
To recap, our numerical results establish that a negative association between A and 
Y , when restricting our attention to patients with M = 1 (OR AS < 1) does not imply either OR CE < 1, or OR CDE < 1 or OR CDE|A=1,M =1 < 1. Therefore, even under the simple generative model considered by Sperrin et al., the "obesity paradox" can be artifactual and fully due to collider bias.
Discussion
Obesity is widely considered as a cause of early death. With the notations used in this article, this means that the causal odds-ratio, 
is superior to 1. However, several observational studies reported an observed oddsratio among individuals with diabetes or heart failure 2,3,13 less than one, suggesting that OR AS < 1. This observation could indeed be considered as paradoxical if the observed odds-ratio among individuals with chronic disease was a consistent estimate of OR CE . However, this is not the case because M is a descendent of A, as already suggested in the literature 4 . Contrary to what Sperrin et al. reported 1 , we show that this difference between OR AS and OR CE can be important even under the simple causal model they considered. In addition, we show that OR AS , OR CDE and OR CDE|A=1,M =1 share some similarities, but are still different. In particular, by considering additional interaction terms in the generative model proposed by Sperrin et al., we exhibited configurations where OR AS < 1 while OR CDE > 1 and
. Therefore, estimates of OR AS should be regarded with caution since they can not be related to any meaningful causal effects.
Furthermore, the confounder U has to be observed in order to estimate the causal quantities OR CDE and OR CDE|A=1,M =1 . As for OR CE , it can not be identified from the distribution of (A, M, U, Y ) without further assumptions on the causal model.
We shall add that even if we could estimate OR CDE and OR CE , these quantities might not be appropriate to answer the question of whether weight loss would be beneficial for an obese patient with diabetes or heart failure 13 . (that is, his risk had he never been obese), then it is simply P (Y A=0 |A = 1, M = 1).
it is noteworthy that this assumption implies that this patient might be cured of diabetes after his weight loss. Under this assumption, the quantity of interest is therefore
. It is related to ∆ CE , but also to the excess fraction and, under some assumptions, to the attributable fraction and the probability of disablement 5, 7 . However, if weight loss is unlikely to cure this patient of diabetes, his risk after a weight loss might rather be
the quantity of interest would be
Lastly, because there is no unique and well-defined intervention resulting in weight loss (or weight gain), causal inference on observational data is a particularly complicated task when dealing with obesity 6 . As a matter of fact, to answer the question whether weight loss would be beneficial for obese patients with diabetes, a safer roadmap would be first specifying the envisaged intervention(s) which might result in weight loss, and then planning a randomized interventional study.
6 Technical details 6.1 A brief introduction to structural causal models 6.1.1 The causal model of Figure 1 We refer to 5, 8, 10 for a thorough introduction of causal models and counterfactuals.
Here, the fundamental concepts are illustrated in the particular case of the model considered in 1 . Figure 1 autonomous function, whose inputs are the parents of the variable, along with its associated exogenous variable. In our example, the set of structural equations is
where, f A , f U , f M and f Y are the unspecified autonomous functions. In this article, we assume that the exogenous variables (or disturbances) are mutually independent.
The structural equations are further helpful to precisely define the variables we would have been able to observe had we intervened to fix the value(s) of some variable(s). In particular, in the counterfactual world Ω A=a that would have followed the intervention do(A = a) 5,7,9 , we would have been able to observe the variables
From these equations, it is clear that consistency holds since, if
Variables we would have been able to observe in the counterfactual world Ω a,m that would have followed the double intervention do(A = a, M = m) can be defined too: We conclude this brief introduction by inspecting the simplified causal model of Figure   2 . In this case, A is not a parent of Y , and there is no confounder. Then, the set of structural equations becomes
Accordingly, the counterfactual variables Y A=a , M A=a and Y a,m are defined as
This simplified setting corresponds to that considered in Figure 10 in 10 . Figure 5 presents the SWIT corresponding to the intervention do(A = a) 10 . 
, it is straightforward to compute P (Y A=a = 1|M = 1), hence ∆ CE , for any combinations of values for the parameters α 0 , α A , α U , α AU , β 0 , β A , β U , β M , β AM , β AU , β U M and β AU M .
